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This paper  decomposes  the observed  wage  difference between  male  and 
female  workers  into the portions associated with three types of segregation 
and  with the individual's sex.  The  contribution of each  type of segregation 
is the product of two factors:  the extent of segregation and  the wage  penalty 
(estimated  coefficient)  associated with working in  a female-dominated 
constituent. 
In  five Bureau of Labor  Statistics Industry Wage  Surveys,  the earnings 
of  men  and  women  in  the same  occupation at the same  establishment  differ by 
only 1%.  Much  of  the difference in  pay  between  men  and  women  is  associated 
with segregation by occupation  (this reduces  women's  wages  by 11% to  28%). 
But  segregation by establishment  and  work  group also lowers  the wages  of women 
by a total of 12%. 
Comparisons  are also made  between  the union and  nonunion  sectors of  two 
industries.  Union establishments  are characterized by  less variation based  on 
occupational  and  individual wage  penalties,  but more  variation based on 
establishment  segregation. THE  STRUCTURE  OF  THE  FEMALEIMALE  WAGE  DIFFERENTIAL: 
IS  IT WHO  YOU  ARE,  WHAT  YOU  DO,  OR  WHERE  YOU  WORK? 
I. Introduction 
A  variety of policies have  been  enacted  and  proposed  to  reduce  wage 
differences  between  men  and  women.  Each  addresses  certain components  of the 
total differential.  For  example,  equal  pay  provisions focus on  individual 
differences  wi  thin work  group; '  comparable  worth targets i  nequal i  ty based  on 
proportion female  in  occupation or work  group;  equal  opportunity legislation 
attempts  to  reduce  interemployer and  work  group  segregation.  The  potential 
efficacy  of each  policy depends  on  the relative magnitude of the  component(s) 
addressed.  For  example,  equal  pay  legislation may  be  fully effective,  but it 
will not reduce  the femalelmale wage  differential  significantly if very little 
inequality is  due  to  wage  differences between  the  sexes  within work  group. 
Thus,  one  step  toward  comparing  the policies is to  consider  which  are 
aimed  at the largest source(s).  This paper  addresses  the question by 
estimating the contribution of each  of  the following  to the  wage  disparity 
between  men  and  women:  differences between  individuals in  the  same  occupation 
and  establ i  shment,  or sex  segregation by occupation,  by  establ i  shment,  or by 
work  group. 
The  role of the workplace  (i.e.,  establishment and  work  group)  has  been 
relatively neglected  in  previous  studies of the effect  of  segregation on 
wages.  The  composition of the  femalelmale  wage  differential is studied in 
five industries,  using Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics (BLS)  Industry Wage  Surveys. Although most  studies ascribe observed  wage  differentials to  differences 
in  human  capital, many  observed  differentials (especially  those  linked to 
demographic  characteristics such  as  sex  and  race)  defy attempts  to  attribute 
them  solely to  human  capital.  The  size of  estimated industry,  employer,  and 
work  group wage  differentials suggests  that they could be  a large part of the 
wage  differences observed among  races  or between  men  and  women.'  Thus, 
investigation of the workplace as  a source of wage  differentials  seems 
particularly relevant. 
Models  of the femalelmale wage  differential fall into three basic groups: 
human  capital,  compensating  differentials, and  discrimination.  The  first type 
explains differences in  earnings  by deficiencies  in  acquired human  capital 
(education,  on-the-job-training, etc.).  In  the strict version,  women  invest 
in  less human  capital because  they expect  to  work  outside the home  for  less of 
their adult lives (Polachek  C19811).  Alternatively,  differential returns or 
costs  to  investment  caused  by  discrimination could also link proportion female 
with low wages  among  occupations.  In  either case,  the role of the workplace 
in  this model  is  not obvious.  Most  wage  differences should be  associated with 
occupation  and  with the individual within the work  group,  unless 
establishments  or work  groups  are  sorted by quality. 
The  second  explanation assumes  that women  have  a greater taste for nonwage 
compensation  (perhaps  because  of uneven  allocation of  homemaking 
responsibilities) and  that employers  generally offer the same  benefit  package 
to  groups of  employees.  Or,  working conditions are associated primari  ly with 
occupation or industry,  and  women  have  stronger preferences for clean,  quiet, 
flexible,  or attractive environments  (Filer C19831).  In  either version,  women 
are  sorted into the high-benefitllow-wage  jobs. -3- 
Compensating  differentials should generate an  association between 
segregation and  wages  in  establishments and occupations.  Work  group  effects 
should be  minimal,  and  limited to  cases  where  work  conditions vary by 
establishment  within occupation or where  benefit packages  change  significantly 
among  different occupations  in  an  establishment  (e.g.,  between  exempt  and 
nonexempt  positions).  Also,  individual  effects should be  positive,  to 
compensate  women  for the inferior package  of  benefits offered. 
Finally,  the theoretical literature offers various models  of 
discrimination in  the ~orkplace.~  The  problem with the  simplest models  is. 
that employer  discrimination should  lower profits (unless it  is  due  to  tastes 
of  coworkers  or customers).  Thus,  owners  of capital  will prefer to  invest in 
firms that do not discriminate,  thereby reducing the prevalence of 
discrimination. 
Agency  costs,  however,  introduce slack into the system,  which  loosens  the 
discipline imposed  by  the marketplace.  Suppose  that,  in  each  establishment, 
managers  exercise  their taste for discrimination in  only a few of  the 
occupations  they oversee,  or that only a subset of  each  establishment's 
supervisors discriminate.  Then,  a firm's expected gains from eliminating 
discrimination may  be  small  or negative,  when  coupled with the cost of 
internal monitoring.  Furthermore,  if all firms have  a random amount  of 
discriminatory activity among  their supervisors or managers,  most  variation in 
discrimination occurs  within firms,  rather than between  them. 
This  version suggests  that segregation by establishment  will have  a 
smaller impact  than segregation by work  group.  But establishment,  work  group, 
and  individual sex  will all contribute to  the femalelmale wage  differential. 
Little  empirical work  has  been  offered on the workplace effects  on wage 
differentials,  in  part because of data limitations.  In  a major  exception, Blau (1977)  proposes  and  tests a model  in  which employers  set wages  according 
to  external  wage  contours  and  internal labor markets,  rather than solely 
according to  local  labor-market conditions.  Thus,  firms with high wages 
choose  from a queue  of  applicants,  introducing latitude for discrimination in 
hiring.  In  BLS  Area  Wage  Surveys,  Blau finds that wages  and  the percentage  of 
females  in  one's work  group  were  negatively correlated within occupation, 
controlling for sex  of the individual. 
Another  exception is  Bielby and  Baron  (1984),  who  find that firms are 
highly and  permanently  segregated  by work  group:  individuals are employed  in 
work  groups  composed  almost entirely of  members  of their own  sex. 
This  study expands  Blau's  work  by comparing  the size of  four components  of 
the femalelmale wage  differential  within industry--the individual,  occupation, 
establishment,  and  work  group--to estimate how  much  each  contributes to  the 
total observed differential  .  The  observed femal  elmal  e wage  differential i  s 
divided into several  components  that each  reflect the extent to  which  sex 
segregation associated with a labor-market structure contributes  to  the total 
differential  in  a working population.  It  will be  shown  that the size of  a 
component  depends  on  two factors:  the extent of segregation by  sex  among 
constituents of the component,  and  the magnitude of the penalty associated 
with working in  a female-dominated constituent. 
The  method  uses  ordinary least squares  regression to  decompose  an  observed 
wage  differential,  without assuming  any  particular theory of wage 
determination or discrimination.  It  provides  a way  to  examine  the extent to 
which  segregation-based models  have  an  empirical  foundation.  The  method  of 
decomposition  is  a variant of  that introduced in  Oaxaca  (1973)  and  Blinder 
(1  973). 11.  Method 
For  ease  of exposition,  the method  is  presented in terms  of  only two 
components  (individual  and  occupation),  although two more  (establishment and 
work  group)  are considered in  the actual  estimation.  Cansider the case  of 
individual i  in  occupation j, with log wage  Wij. 
Let fi,  =  female  dummy  variable for individual i in  occupation j, 
n =  number  of individuals in  the working population, 
nj =  number  of individuals in  occupation j, 
r  =  c  cfijln, the proportion of the work  force that is  female,  and 
j  i 
rj  =  cfij/nj,  the proportion of  occupation j  that is female. 
I 
The  following wage  equation is  estimated: 
(1)  wi,  =  A  +  Gefij +  Barj  +  eij, 
where  A  is the work-force mean  wage  and  G is the estimated wage  effect of 
being female,  controlling for the proportion female of  one's  occupation.  B is 
the estimated wage  effect of  working in  a female-dominated occupation, 
controlling for the sex  of the individual.  A  person who  switched  from an 
all-male occupation to  an  all-female occupation would  suffer an  average  wage 
loss of B.  Last,  e,j is the estimated error term. 
Following Oaxaca  (1973)  and  Blinder  (19731,  the observed  femalelmale  wage 
differential  in  a working population is simply  the difference between  the 
average  wage  of women  and  the average  wage  of  men: 
- 
(2)  D  =  Wfemale - -  Wma i e  =  G  +  B  (~f  - F?), 
where 
- 
r;  =  c  c f  ,rj1rn,  the mean  proportion female  in  occupation among  females,  and 
j  i 
- 
ry  =  c  c  (1-fi,)rj/(l-r>n,  the mean  proportion female  in  occupation among  males. 
j  i As  D  becomes  more  negative,  the wage  difference between  men  and  women 
increases.  The  observed  difference between  the wages  of  men  and  women  in  the 
work  force is the sum  of  G  (the estimated wi  thin-occupation wage  differential 
between men  and  women)  and  a  term for the estimated  impact of segregation 
among  occupations.  The  impact of segregation is the product of two  terms:  B 
(the wage  change  associated with an  increasing concentration of women  in  an 
occupation)  and  the extent of  segregation among  occupations (the difference in 
the average  proportion of women  in  the occupations  held by  women  compared  to 
that of the average  occupation held by men). 
Accordingly,  define S  as  the extent of segregation: 
S measures  the extent of segregation on  a scale from  0  to  1 (increasing as 
occupations become  more  segregated)  and  can  be  associated with a commonly  used 
measure  of  segregation.  Another  algebraic representation for S is  as  follows: 
where  pj =  n,/n,  the proportion of the work  force in  occupation j, and 
s:  =  c  Cpjrgl - r
2, the sample  variance of rj. 
j  j 
This  form  is  intuitively appealing if  one  notes  the range of the variance 
of  rj.  At  the lower  extreme,  if the work  force were  totally integrated, 
then r,  = r for all j, so  the variance of rj  would  be  zero.  On  the other 
hand,  total segregation of the work  force maximizes  the variance of rj: 
2 
(5)  max  s,  =  r(1-r)'  +  (1-r>(0-r)2  =  r(1-r). 
j 
Thus,  S,  the ratio  of the variance of r,  to  r(1-r),  is the ratio  of - 7  - 
the actual  variance  to  the maximum  possible variance.  Most  other 
investigations of the impact of segregation  (e.g.,  Beller  [19841)  use  another 
measure,  the displacement  index,  to  measure  segregation.  The  properties of 
the displacement  index  (SD)  are quite similar to  those of  S.'  The  most 
familiar version of the formula for SD  is  as  follows: 
where  Mj =  proportion of  male  work  force in  occupation j, and 
Fj =.proportion of female  work  force in  occupation j. 
In  the notation used  in  this paper,  SD  reduces  to  the following: 
Comparing  expression  (7) to  expression  (4),  it is  clear that S and  SD  are 
both ratios of  a measure  of  deviation to  the maximum  possible variance.  S and 
SD  share  common  bounds  (0  =  perfectly integrated,  to  1 =  completely 
segregated),  and  are composed  of the same  terms.  The  difference between  them 
is  that SD  measures  deviation by  the mean  absolute deviation of  proportion 
female,  while S  takes  the mean  squared  deviation.  SD  and  S will be  most 
similar close to  the bounds  or if r  is close to 112.  The  advantages  of the SD 
measure  are insensitivity to outliers,  and  easy  interpretation of the 
proportion of  women  who  would have  to  be  redistributed among  occupations  in 
order to  achieve perfect integration. 
The  particular advantage  of S is its use  in the simple decomposition of 
the femalefmale  wage  differential  shown  in  equation  (2).  This  treatment may 
be  easily generalized to include segregation among  establishments  and  other 
labor market  institutions,  simply by adding terms  that are the product of the 
penalty and  the extent of  segregation: where  k  =  labor market  structure k  (occupation,  establishment,  or work  group), 
B
k  =  estimated  coefficient on proportion female  in institution k,  and 
- 
S
k  =  r:  -  =  extent of segregation among  constituents of  k. 
Expression  (8)  is  a decomposition  of the type introduced by Oaxaca  (1973) 
and  Blinder  (1973>,  where  the male  and  female  coefficients  are constrained to 
eq~ality.~  Table  1  summarizes  the application of  this technique.  The 
components  and  their factors are listed with definitions  and  interpretations. 
The  sum  of the four components  is the total observed  wage  differential. 
111.  Description of  the Data 
This  study presents  decompositions of the femalelmale  wage  differential in 
the miscellaneous  plastics products,  life insurance,  nonelectrical machinery, 
banking,  and  computer  and  data processing industries.  These  industries were 
chosen  as  examples  because  they employ  significant  numbers  of  both men  and 
women,  represent both manufacturing and  service industries,  and  have  a  low 
incidence of incentive-based compensation. 
Analysi  s of industries separat;ly  a1 lows occupations  to  be  defined 
narrowly,  while a  large proportion of  each  employer's  work  force is covered. 
In  cross-industry surveys,  either occupations must  be  very broadly defined or 
the vast majority of the employees  of  each  establishment must  be  excluded from 
analysis,  because  only support occupations  are employed  in  common  across 
employers.  Since  industries are themselves  somewhat  segregated by  sex,  but do 
not (in general)  overlap much  in  occupations,  analysis within industry tends -9- 
to  underestimate  the contribution of establishment and  work  group  segregation. 
The  analysis uses  five Bureau  of Labor  Statistics Industry Occupational 
Wage  Surveys  (INS).  Table  2  presents means  of the relevant characteristics. 
The  data consist of the wages,  sex,  occupation,  and  establishment  identifier 
of individual  production and  maintenance  workers  in the manufacturing 
industries,  and  of individual nonsupervisory  workers  in the service 
industries.  The  jobs covered  are described in  great detai  1,  are particular to 
the industry in  question,  and  generally cover  approximately 60% of 
establishment employment.  Wages  reported are straight-time hourly earnings 
(no overtime or shift premiums  included)  for hourly workers,  and  average 
hourly earnings  for incentive workers.  ' 
The  surveys  are extensive,  covering 15,000  to  76,000  workers  in  221  to  876 
establishments.  In  general,  establishments  surveyed for an  INS are a random 
sample  of those  employing 25  or more  workers  in  the industry,  though  the 
cutoff varies  somewhat  by  industry.  A unique establishment  identifier is 
provided for each place of  employment,  but actual  identity of  employers  is 
withheld. 
An  important  feature of these data is  the detail of the occupation 
definitions.  The  appendix  consists of listings of the job classifications 
surveyed in the five samples.  For  example,  in  the plastics sample,  codes 
distinguish among  three occupations working on  a blow-molding machine: 
"operate,"  "set up,"  and  "set up  and operate."  This level of 
industry-specific detail controls more  completely  for differences in  job 
content and  worker  training than do  the broader  occupational  codes  used  in 
other surveys;  for example,  four-digit Dictionary of  Occupation  Titles or 
three-digit Census  codes.  Following BLS  practice,  for brevity in  the 
discussion that follows (except  where  noted),  the term "occupation" will be 
used  as  a synonym  for IWS  job classification,  which is the more  accurate  term. - 10 - 
IV.  Decomposition of the FemaleIMale  Wage  Differential  in  Five Industries 
1.  Decomposition of the Differential  in  Two  Manufacturing Industries 
Table  3  reports  the decomposition  of the femalelmale  wage  differential  in 
the miscellaneous  plastics products  and  nonelectrical machinery manufacturing 
industries.  The  total differential between  the wages  of  men  and  women  in  the 
two  samples  (-.240  and  -.298>  is substantially lower  than the differential 
observed  in  broader  samples.  For  example,  the Current Population Survey 
usually records  a differential of about 40% because  of the inclusion of 
white-collar workers  and  other industries.  Thus,  the results for the 
occupation and  establishment  components  below  would almost certainly be  larger 
in  a broader  sample--because more  diverse occupations and  establishments  would 
be  represented.  The  effects on  the individual  and  work  group  components  are 
difficult to  predict. 
First,  log wages  of individuals are regressed on a constant  term and  four 
regressors:  a female  dummy,  and  the proportion female  in  the individual's 
occupation,  establ i  shment,  and  work  group.  The  coefficients and  standard 
errors from this regression are reported in  the first  column of Table  3.  All 
estimated coefficients are negative and  significant,  except for the individual 
term in  machinery.  The  coefficients on  the individual dummy  in  both 
industries are very small,  suggesting  that males  and  females  in the same 
occupation and  establishment (i.e.,  work  group)  are not paid very differently. 
The  fact that inclusion of simple  linear measures  of "femaleness" of 
occupation,  establishment,  and  work  group reduces  the coefficient on  the 
female dummy  to  1% or less suggests  that the specification used  is appropriate.  There  is  no algebraic reason  that the individual  term should  be 
reduced  so  dramatically.  Although  more  complex  measures  and  nonlinearities 
could be  introduced,  the maximum  additional  impact  of such  terms  is limited to 
less than 2%,  the  size of the  individual component  in Table  3. 
In  both industries,  the three coefficients  on  the proportion female  are 
all large,  and  occupation has  the largest coefficient.  Converting from log 
differences to  percentage  differences,  a  switch from an  all-male to  an 
all-female occupation would mean  a  wage  loss of about  22% for a worker  in 
plastics and  a loss of 36% for a worker  in  machinery,  regardless of the 
person's  sex.  The  wage  impact  of such  a switch may  simply reflect large 
differences in the average  human  capital between  the  sexes. 
The  results for work  group  and  establishment  are less consistent across 
industry.  A  switch either to  an  establishment  or to  a work  group  dominated  by 
the other  sex  entails a wage  change  of  about  9%  in  plastics.  In  machinery, 
the coefficient on  a switch in  the sex  composition  of  one's establishment  is 
much  larger  (.330)  than the effect of  a  sex-of-work-group  switch  (.058). 
The  second  column  of Table  3  shows  the extent of segregation  among 
occupations,  establishments,  and  work  groups;  that is,  the  likelihood of 
switches  such  as  those mentioned above.  Consistent with Bielby and  Baron 
(19841,  work  groups  are highly segregated  by  sex.  It  is  very unusual  for a 
worker  to  have  a  job in  a work  group  dominated by  the opposite  sex--more 
unusual  than  for the worker  to  work  in  an  integrated occupation.  The  variance 
of  proportion female  in  work  groups  is  65% to  75% of  what it  would be  in  a 
totally segregated  society (i.e.,  where  men  and  women  always  worked  in 
single-sex work  groups).  In  plastics, occupations  are more  segregated  than 
establishments,  while the opposite  is true in  machinery. - 12  - 
The  third column  for each  industry reports the product of  columns  1 and  2 
for each  labor market  structure.  In  each  case,  this number  is  the  size of the 
wage  differential that would  be  observed  in  the population if this were  the 
only source of femalelmale wage  differences.  It is  also the amount  by  which 
the observed  wage  differential would  decrease,  were  this source of the 
differential to  be  el  iminated. 
Consistent with Blau  (19771,  Buckley  (1971),  McNulty (1967)  and  Bielby and 
Baron  (19841,  the results from the two  industries agree  that the smallest 
source of the differential is individual  sex  within work  group.  In  plastics, 
elimination of  this source  would  narrow the wage  gap  between men  and  women  by 
only about  1.6%,  while in  machinery it  would  leave  the gap  unchanged. 
In  plastics,  although  the coefficients on proportion female  in 
establishment and  work  group  are similar,  the greater amount  of  segregation by 
work group causes  a larger differential  component.  Establishment  contributes 
only -.029  log points,  while work  group  is  the source of -.078  log points of 
the total -.240  difference.  In  machinery,  establishments are more  highly 
segregated than occupations,  and more  than compensate  for a lower  wage  penalty. 
Occupation,  by virtue of the large wage  penalty  (i.e.,  coefficient) on 
proportion female and  the amount  of segregation among  its constituents,  is 
associated with half of the observed difference in  wages  between men  and 
women.  This  is consistent with much  of the literature on occupational 
segregation  (e.g.,  Beller C19841  and  Johnson  and  Solon  C19861).  In  both 
industries,  however,  even if occupations  were  evenly integrated,  wages  of  men 
would  still be  12% higher  than those of  women. 
Another  way  to  look at the results is  to  note that in  plastics,  for 
example,  a  woman  in  a 50% female occupation earns  about .14  log wage  points 
less  (-.016  plus one  half of  -.242)  than the average man  in  the same - 13 - 
establishment.  But if she  worked  in  an  all-female work  group,  her wages  would 
be  as  low as  if she  worked  in  an  all-female occupation.  And  if she  worked  at 
an  all-female establishment,  her  wages  would  be  .34  log wage  points lower  than 
those of a man  working in  an  all-male establishment in  the same  occupation. 
But how  likely are these  scenarios?  The  amount  of segregation by  each of 
these  structures suggests  that single-sex work  groups  are quite common. 
Apparently,  it  is unusual  for a woman  to  be  employed  in  an  integrated or, 
particularly,  predominantly male occupation or work  group.  For  whatever 
reason  (human  capital,  preferences,  or discrimination),  people  work  in  work 
groups  composed  predominantly of members  of their own  sex. 
2.  Decomposition of the Differential in Three  Service Industries 
Table  4  reports the decomposition of the femalelmale wage  differential in 
three service industries.  The  total differential between  the wages  of  men  and 
women  in  the samples  is  about -.45 log wage  points.  This differential  is 
similar to  that of the U.S.  and  is substantially more  than the differential in 
the two manufacturi  ng i  ndustri  es,  where  the occupations  were  not as  varied. 
Nevertheless,  the service  industry results are fairly consistent with the 
manufacturing results. 
Most  consistent is the size of  the individual coefficient.  It is  again 
very small  (-.013  to  -.017>  and  virtually the same  as  the -.016  estimate in 
plastics.  Most of the femalelmale  differential arises from rates applied to 
all individuals  in  a category,  rather than from differences  in the treatment 
of individuals. 
Occupations  in the services are about as  segregated  as  those  in  plastics 
and machinery.  However,  banking and  life  insurance establishments  are far 
less segregated  than those  in  computers  and  the manufacturing industries. 
Work  groups  appear  to  be  somewhat  less  segregated in  the services. - 14 - 
Counteracting  lower  segregation,  estimated coefficients on  proportion 
female  are generally larger (in absolute value)  in  the service samples. 
Practically the entire extra differential in  the service  samples  (relative to 
those  in  manufacturing)  can  attributed to  the magnitude of the occupation 
coefficient  in  the service industries.  Although  in  services men  and  women  are 
in  the same  work  group more  often,  wages  are so  strongly linked to  proportion 
male  in  service occupations that women  earn  significantly less than men  in 
these three industries.  This could reflect higher variation in the human 
capital requirements  (perhaps,  technical  training) of nonsupervisory jobs  in 
the  service industries. 
The  coefficients on proportion female in  establishment  are tightly 
clustered (-.256  to  -.375>  and  larger (in absolute value)  than those  for  work 
group  (+.023  to  -.283).  Extensive  segregation among  work  groups  magnifies 
the impact of the relatively small  coefficients on proportion female  in  work 
group.  Thus,  the sum  of  the contributions of  establishment and  work  group  is 
quite tightly clustered among  industries,  ranging from a low of .08  log points 
(computers)  to a high of  .18  log points (machinery). 
3.  Unionism and  the Structure of  the FemaleIMale Wage  Differential 
Tables  5 and  6  perform the same  decomposition as  in  Table  3,  for  the union 
and  nonunion establishments  in the plastics and machinery  industries 
separately.  The  results are intriguing and  suggest  some  major  differences 
between  the union and  nonunion  sectors.  While  the total differentials and  the 
patterns of  extent of  segregation  are about  the same  size in  the union and 
nonunion sectors,  the distribution among  components  changes  considerably. 
At the top of the tables,  the individual  portion of the differential  in 
plastics is  about  2%  in  nonunion  jobs and  is  nonexistent  in  union jobs,  which - 15 - 
is consistent with the impact of union  standard-rate policies (Freeman 
C19821).  In  machinery,  virtually no  difference exists within work  group  in 
either the union or nonunion  sector. 
Moving  to  the fourth row,  the size of the work  group  component  is  about 
the same  in the union and  nonunion  sectors for plastics,  but is worse  for 
union women  in  the machinery  sample  (due  to  differences in  coefficients). 
Two  results stand out.  Among  occupations,  union  standard-rate policies 
substantially diminish the contribution of occupational  segregation to the 
wage  differential in both industries.  In  effect,  unions  institute some 
moderate  amount  of comparable  worth.  That  is,  while occupations  are equally 
segregated  in the union and  nonunion  sectors,  the coefficient on percent 
female  in  occupation  is  one-third to  four-sevenths lower  in  the union  sector. 
Unionization may  not diminish occupational  segregation,  but it  apparently 
substantially reduces  the wage  penalty associated with such  segregation. 
The  most  unexpected  difference between  the sectors  is in  the establishment 
component.  In  plastics,  the estimated  coefficient  on percent female  in  the 
nonunion  sector  is zero,  compared  to  -.I56  under  unionization.  In  machinery, 
the nonunion  coefficient is -.152,  which  rises to  -.406 under  unionization. 
This effect has  a number  of potential explanations that cannot  be 
distinguished here: 
1.  Unions  with more  male  workers  are more  successful  at extracting rents 
from employers; 
2.  Union employers  forced  to  pay  above-market  wages  to  workers  select 
proportionally more  males  from the queue  of  applicants attracted by  the high 
wages ; 
3.  Establishments  employing more  men  are more  productive,  but only in  a 
unionized setting can  workers  claim some  of these  rents;  or - 16 - 
4.  Women  have  a greater  taste for nonwage  compensation and  can  voice 
their preferences  in  a unionized setting. 
A  final effect in these  industries  is that union employers  in  both 
industries employ  fewer  women  than their nonunion counterparts,  consistent 
with Blau  (1977).  In short,  these results invite more  investigation into the 
relationship between  unionization and  the structure of the femalelmale  wage 
differential. 
V.  Conclusion 
1.  Findinqs 
This paper  applies a decomposition of the femalelmale  wage  differential 
that clarifies the connection between  segregation and  wage  disparities.  For  a 
labor market  institution to  be  associated with inequality,  two conditions are 
necessary:  its constituents must  be  segregated,  and  wages  must  decline with 
increasing proportions of  female  workers.  The  variance of  proportion female 
among  constituents must  be  sizable,  and  the coefficient on proportion female 
in  the combined  wage  regression must  be  significant and  negative,  or 
segregation associated with that institution is not a large source of the 
femalelmale wage  differential. 
This decomposition  suggests  that policy attempts  to  reduce  inequality may 
be  evaluated on  the basis of the potential  impact of  the proposal  on  the 
differential.  Furthermore,  there are two potential targets in  the reduction 
of segregation-based  sources  of inequality:  the extent of segregation and  the 
size of the wage  penalty.  Elimination of  either is sufficient to  eliminate a 
source of inequality,  but one  may  be  easier to  implement  than the other. - 17 - 
The  empirical  findings reported in  this paper  are remarkably consistent 
across  the five industries studied: 
1.  Wages  of  males  and  females  in the same  occupation and  establishment 
differ by  about  1%. 
2.  The  largest source of the femalelmale  wage  differential is the 
association between  wage  rates and  proportion female  in  occupations,  which 
accounts  for half to  three-quarters of the differential observed,  or a 
difference in  wages  of 11% (manufacturing)  to  26% (services)  when  converted to 
percentages.  The  wage  loss associated with a switch from an  all-male to  an 
all-female occupation ranges  from 21% to  57% in  the five industries studied. 
3.  Segregation by establishment within industry and  by work  group  (i.e., 
the structures most  under  control  of employers)  also contributes significantly 
to  wage  inequal i  t~.~  Work  groups  are far more  segregated  than 
establishments,  but the wage  penalty associated with an  increasing proportion 
female  is larger for establishments than for work  groups.  These  offsetting 
factors cause  variation in  the relative impact of  establishment  and  work  group 
segregation among  industries;  segregation by each of these  two  structures 
reduces  women's  wages  by 6%  to  7%,  for a total loss of  8%  to  16% (or  from 
one-quarter to  one-half of the total differenti  a1 1. 
4.  In two manufacturing industries,  unionism has  a pronounced effect  on 
the composition of the femalelmale  wage  differential without affecting 
patterns of segregation.  Any  wage  disparity that exists between men  and  women 
in  the same  work  group  disappears  under  unionism.  Unionism is  also associated 
with two other  interesting effects:  wages  are less closely tied to  the 
percent female  in  one's occupation,  but are more  closely tied to  the 
proportion female  in  one's establishment. - 18 - 
These figures suggest that men and women who work in the same occupation 
and establishment earn about the same amount.  However, occupations are either 
mostly male or mostly female, and within establishments,  occupations are 
almost completely segregated.  Furthermore, establishments as a whole tend to 
employ either more men or more women than average in the work force for  the 
industry. 
Thus, the role of  high-wage employers in  segregation takes one of  two 
forms.  If their wages for all  occupations are higher than average, they tend 
to concentrate on hiring men for all occupations.  Just as important 
empirically, when they pay a subset of  occupations more than their 
occupational average  (adjusting  for overall establishment differential),  they 
hire a disproportionate number of men for those work groups. 
So, even a worker who has chosen an integrated occupation will  probably be 
hired to work primarily with members of hislher own sex.  If he is male, this 
will  tend to  raise his wages.  If she is female, it will  lower them. 
2.  Relevance to Theory 
In order to  fully evaluate policy to reduce the femalelmale wage 
differential, it is necessary to know the source(s> of the differential. 
Although this decomposition cannot fully distinguish among the three major 
models of the source of  the femalelmale wage differential, it throws some 
light on which versions of  each model are most consistent with observed 
patterns.  In particular, any version invoked must predict no sex differential 
within work group, and wide segregation by sex, especially among work groups. 
Omission of human capital or worker quality variables that are negatively 
correlated with proportion female would bias downward the estimated 
coefficient on proportion female for institutions whose constituents are - 19 - 
sorted by  human  capital.  No  doubt,  a significant portion of the occupation 
component  is due  to  differences in  the human  capital of  men  and  women.  As  a 
corollary,  there are no  sizable differences in  human  capital between  men  and 
women  within the work  group.  That  makes  problematic the importance of the 
work  group  and  establishment  components  (controlling for proportion female  in 
occupation)  within a pure human  capital framework.  Research  is needed  on  the 
question of  whether  firms effectively sort among  applicants on  the basis of 
quality within occupation.  If such  sorting does  not take place,  one-third to 
one-half of the differential  (the work  group and  establishment  components)  is 
not due  to  differential productivity. 
Previous  empirical  evidence  for the existence of substantial compensating 
differentials is  weak,  both for working  conditions  (Brown  C19801,  Smith 
C19791,  somewhat  countered by Filer C19831)  and  for fringe benefits (Freeman 
C19811>,  Smith  and  Ehrenberg  C19811,  and  Atrostic C19831).  In this study,  the 
individual  component  is not positive,  and  the work  group  component  is 
sizable.  Combined  with weak  evidence  on  the impact of  compensating 
differentials in  general,  these results argue  against equalizing differences, 
except,  perhaps,  among  occupations. 
As  in  other studies,  evidence of discrimination in  this case  consists 
partly of  providing direct evidence  to  eliminate competing theories." 
However,  the pattern uncovered  here  (primarily the size of the work  group and 
establishment  components)  is consistent with the existence of  discrimination 
by  employers.  To  the extent that this pattern arises from discriminatory 
behavior,  the direction of causality is  of  great interest,  but these  results 
cannot  distinguish whether  (exogenously)  high-wage  employers  tend  to 
discriminate,  or  whether  discriminators are forced to  pay  high wages. 
The  decomposition performed here  suggests  some  important  topics for 
further research.  In  particular,  to  what  extent do employers  sort among  job - 20 - 
applicants by productivity-related characteristics?  Are  discriminators  forced 
to  pay  high wages,  or do high-wage  employers  tend to  discriminate?  What 
determines  the sex  composition of a work  group?  What  is the reason for the 
higher association between  proportion female  and  wages  in  union establishments? 
3.  Relevance  to  Policy 
These  findings are best  interpreted in light of extant and  proposed 
policies to  reduce  wage  inequality between  men  and  women.  Table  7  presents a 
summary  of  five such policies:  four federal acts or orders,  and  comparable 
worth (which  has  been  proposed,  not enacted).  Table 8  relates the provisions 
described in  Table  7  to  the decomposition performed  in this paper.  Each 
component's  factors and  their mean  values  (as  estimated here)  are listed with 
the provisions intended to  reduce  them,  distinguishing between  provisions 
aimed at  human  capital  and  employer  discrimination models. 
The  compensating differential model  is not included because  all behavior 
is efficient under  this model,  so  to  the extent that the sex  differential  is  a 
compensating differential,  no  corrective policies are necessary.  Under  a 
human  capital model,  equal  access  to  education may  increase  the productivity 
of  women,  reducing the  individual and  occupational  components. 
11 
In  contrast,  discrimination explanations generate  two potential policy 
instruments  for the three components  of  the differential associated with 
segregation.  The  individual component  (which  is  not associated with 
segregation)  has  only one  potential instrument:  lowering the wage  penalty 
associated with an  individual's sex  within work  group--via equal  pay  and 
perhaps EEO  training.  For  the other  three components,  the two potential 
instruments are reduction of segregation  (through EEO  provisions and 
affirmative  action)  and  reduction of the wage  penalty (through  comparable 
worth). - 21  - 
How  effective could each  of these  policies be?  Taking the four components 
individually,  wages  of women  are only 1% below  those  of men  in  their work 
group.  This,  then,  is the maximum  possible effect of the provisions targeted 
at this component:  in  particular,  equal  pay,  but also parts of equal 
education and  EEO  training.  Either these  provisions  have  already been  quite 
successful,  or this component  was  never  the main  source  of the 
differential.  '* 
In  contrast,  policies that reduce  the occupation  component  could cut the 
femalelmale  wage  differential by  one-half (manufacturing)  to  three-quarters 
(services)  in  our  samples. 
The  next largest components  are work  group  and  establishment,  which 
together  account  for about  a 13% reduction in  women's  relative wages.  Unless 
establishments  and  work  groups  are  sorted by  human  capital that is  unequally 
distributed between  men  and  women,  the provisions based on models  of 
discrimination offer the only solutions. 
EEO,  affirmative action,  and  equal  education have  been  on  the books  for 
more  than a decade,  while the femalelmale wage  differential remains  large. 
These  policies aim to  reduce  wage  inequality by reducing  a1 1 three types of 
segregation,  i.e.,  So,  S
e,  and  S
w.  If people  have  judged  them 
ineffective, it  is no  surprise that those interested in  reducing the 
differential would  support  comparable  worth--because  its targets are B
O  and 
B
w,  the otherwise unregulated factors of the two  largest components  of  the 
wage  differential. Footnotes 
In this paper,  the  term "work  group" refers to  the occupation- 
establishment  interaction;  that is,  to  all employees  with the same 
occupation (job classification)  in  a particular establishment. 
Industry wage  differentials persist in the face of attempts  to  attribute 
them  to  human  capital.  See  Dickens  and  Katz  (1986)  and  Krueger  and 
Summers  (1986)  for recent summaries  of these  investigations.  Also, 
Groshen  (1986)  shows  that even  within industries,  substantial  stable wage 
differentials exist among  employers  and  work  groups,  controlling for very 
detailed occupation,  whereas  wage  variation among  individuals within a 
work  group  is minimal. 
See  Blau and  Ferber  (1986)  and  Reskin and  Hartmann  (1986)  for summaries. 
Williams and  Register  (1986)  perform a similar analysis on U.S.  Census 
data for 50  cities and  eight occupations and  find that wages  are 
negatively correlated with proportion male  within occupation  in  a city, 
controlling for various characteristics of the city. 
The  properties of the displacement  index  are explored  in  Duncan  and  Duncan 
(1  955). 
'his constraint is  appropriate because  establishment  wage  policies are  (by 
aw)  designed  to  be  sex-blind in  their application.  What  differs between 
,he  sexes  is their access  to  positions.  Oaxaca  (1973)  estimates  separate 
equations for men  and  women,  dividing the differentials between  the 
portions due  to  differences  in  slopes  from those due  to  differences  in 
mean  values of independent variables. 
A  positive coefficient suggests  that wages  increase  with the proportion 
female,  counteracting the effect of the negative coefficients  to  some 
extent. 
Work  group  segregation is controlled by  employers  in  the sense  that they 
apparently have  a strong tendency  not to  employ  both men  and  women  in  the 
same  occupation.  Even  in  heavily female occupations,  the few males  in  the 
occupation are clustered in just a few establishments. 
Note  that if segregation by  industry were  added  to  the establishment 
effect (as  in  Blau  C19771),  the establishment  component  would  clearly 
dominate  the work  group  component. 
This phenomenon  is  not unexpected  when  the  type of discrimination under 
investigation is illegal. 11.  Policy prescriptions  will be  ineffective or inefficient if they interfere 
with unconstrained optimization on  the part of  market participants.  Thus, 
equal  access  to  education for women  will reduce  the differential only to 
the extent that previous  inequalities in  access  led to  differential 
acquisition of  human  capital.  An  equal  distribution of human  capital 
would  eliminate the correlation between  proportion female  and  the human 
capital requirements  of  a job,  so  the estimated coefficient would be 
zero.  The  real reason for decline in  inequality would be  the reduction in 
segregation by  sex.  All correctly measured  wage  differentials would 
remain  the same,  because  they are based  on productivity differences,  but 
women  would hold more  of the high-wage  jobs.  The  potential efficacy of 
equal  education on  the establishment  and  work  group  components  depends  on 
whether  some  establishments require more  human  capital  in  all or some 
occupations  than do others. 
12.  A  third possibility is that employers  adapted to  the intrusion of  equal 
pay  legislation by redefining job titles.  Workers  of different sex  were 
given slightly different responsibilities in  order to  preserve  traditional 
wage  disparities between  women  and  men  within work  group and  to  justify 
their different pay  schedules.  The  size of the work  group component  will 
increase  with the extent to  which  jobs were  redefined arbitrarily for this 
purpose  by  independent establishments. References 
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Summary  of Terms  in the Decomposition  of the FemaleIMale 
Wage  Differential in  a Population 
Component 
(Estimated  Size)  Factor  Definition  Interpretation 
Individual  G  Estimated  coefficient  Average  difference in  wages 
(G )  on  female dummy  in the  between  men  and  women  in 
wage  equation below.  the same  occupation  in the 
same  establishment  (i.e., 
in the same  work  group). 
Occupation 
Segregation 
(BO  'SO) 





Work  Group 
Segregation 
(0"-Sw> 
Estimated  coefficient  Wage  penalty associated 
on proportion female  with increasing proportion 
of occupation in  the  female  in  an  occupation. 
wage  equation below.  The  difference between  an 
all-female and  an  all-male 
occupation. 
Sample  variance of  Extent of segregation by 
proportion female  sex  in  occupations,  on  a 
across  occupations,  scale from 0  (fully inte- 
divided by maximum  grated)  to  1 (completely 
possible variance.  segregated). 
Estimated  coefficient  Wage  penalty associated 
on proportion female  with increasing proportion 
of establishment in  female  in  an  establishment. 
the wage  equation  The  difference between  an 
below.  all-female and  an  all-male 
establishment. 
Sample  variance of  Extent of segregation by 
proportion female  sex  in  establishments,  on 
across  establishments,  a scale from 0  (fully inte- 
divided by maximum  grated)  to  1 (completely 
possible variance.  segregated). 
Estimated  coefficient  Wage  penalty associated 
on  proportion female  with increasing proportion 
of work  group  in  the  female  in  a work  group. 
wage  equation below.  The  difference between  an 
all-female and  an  all-male 
work  group. 
Sample  variance of  Extent of segregation by 
proporti  on  femal e  sex  in work  groups,  on  a 
across  work  groups,  scale from 0  (fully inte- 
divided by maximum  grated)  to  1 (completely 
possible variance.  segregated). 
Wage  equation estimated: 
w  =  A  +  G'f  +  BO'rO  +  Be-re  +  BW-rW  +  e , 
i  i  i  i  I  i 
where  wi =  natural  log of wage  of individual i,  A  =  constant  term, 




w =  proportion female  in individual  i's  occupation,  establishment, 
i  i  and  work  group,  respectively. Table 2 
Summary  of Industry Wage  Survey Sample  Characteristics 
Mean  Wage 
Variance  In  (Wage) 
Percent Male 
Mi  scel  1  aneous  None1  ectri  cal  Life 
Plasti  cs  Products  Machinery  Insurance  Banki  ng 
(1  974)  (1983)  ( 1980)  (1  980) 
$3.31  $10.20  $6.67  $4.73 
Percent  in  Mostly Union Plants  52.5%  61.6%  2.1%  0.5% 
Mode  Establ i  shment  Size  100-249  2,500+  5,000+  2,500+ 
Sample  Size 
Number  of  Occupations 
Number  of Establishments  876  795  221  580 
Number  of Work  Groups  6,198  7,619  4,246  8,028 
Average Number  of Persons 
per Work  Group  11.4 
Femal e/Mal e Wage  Di  fferenti  a1  -  .240  -.  298  -.  469  -.426 
Computer  and 
Data Processi  ng 
(1983) 
I 
Source:  Tabulations  from  BLS  Industry Wage  Surveys. Table 3 
Decomposition of the Female/Male  Wage  Differential in  Two  Manufacturing  Industries 
Mi scell  aneous  Pl  asti  cs Products  None1  ectri  cal  Machi  nerv 
1  2  3  1  2  3 
Coefficient on  Coefficient on 
Labor  Proporti  on  Proporti  on 
Market  Femal el  Extent of  Structure  Femal e'  Extent of  Structure 
Structure  (s.e.)  Seareaati  on
2  Contri  buti  on
3  . .  Segreaati  on
2  Contri  bution
3 
Individual  -.  0  16  1  .O  -.016 
( .003) 
Occupation  -  .242  .485  -.  117 
( .004) 
Establishment  -.099  .288  -.  029 
( .004) 
Work  Group
4  -.  103  .761  -.  078 
( .005) 
Total  Observed Differentials  -  .240  -.  298 
Coefficient and  standard errors from  an  OLS  regression of log wage  on  proportion female  in 
occupation,  proportion female in  establishment,  proportion female  in  work  group,  and  an  individual 
female  dummy. 
Extent of segregation =  (sample  variance of proportion female  among  constituents of labor market 
structure) /  (maximum  possible variance). 
Coefficient  (from column  1) multiplied by  extent of segregation (from column  2). 
An  individual's work  group is  defined as  all workers  in  the same  occupation  at the same 
establishment. 
Any  difference between  the observed  differential and  the total of the contributions of  the 
structures is  due  to rounding error. 
Source:  Tabulations from the BLS  Plastics and Nonelectrical  Machinery  Industry Wage  Surveys. Table 4 
Decomposition  of  the Female/Male  Wage  Differential  in Three  Service  Industries 
Li  fe Insurance  Banki no  Com~uter  and  Data  Processine 
1  2  3  1  2  3  1  2  3 
Coefficient  on  Coefficient  on  Coefficient  on 
Labor  Proporti  ~n  Proporti  yn  Proporti  on 
Market  Femal e  Extent of  Structure  Femal e  Extent  of  Structure  Female'  Extent of  Structure 
Structure  (s.e.)  Seareaati on
2  Contri buti  on
3  (s.e.)  Seareaati on
2  contri  bution
3  (s.e.)  ~eareaati  on
2  Contri buti on
3 
Individual  -.013  1 .O 
( .006) 
Occupation  -.  686  .477 
(.011) 
Establ i  shment  -.256  .050 
( .004) 
Work  Group
4  -.  195  .596 
( .005) 
R-Square  .513 
Total  Observed  Di  f  ferenti  a1 ' 
'  Coefficient and  standard  errors from  an  OLS  regression of  log wage  on  proportion  female  in occupation,  proportion  female  in establishment, 
proportion female  in work  group,  and  an  individual  female dummy. 
*  Extent. of  segregation  =  (sample variance of  proportion  female  among  constituents of  labor market  structure) /  (maximum  possible variance). 
Coefficient (from  column  1) multiplied  by  extent  of  segregation  (from column  2). 
An  individual's work  group  is defined  as all workers  in  the same  occupation  at the same  establishment. 
'  '~n~  difference between  the observed  differential and  the total  of  the contributions  of  the structures is due  to rounding  error. 
Source:  Tabulations from  the BLS  Industry Wage  Surveys. Table 5 
Union Effects on  the Structure of the Female/Male 
Wage  Differential in  the Miscellaneous Plastics 
Products  Industry 
Nonunion  Establishments  Union Establ i  shments 
1  2  3  1  2  3 
Coefficient on  Coefficient on 
Proporti  on  Extent  Proporti  on  Extent 
Labor  Market  Femal e'  o  f  Structure  Femal el  o  f  Structure 
Structure  (s.e.)  Seareaati  on
2  Contri  buti  on
3  . .  Seareaati  on








Observed  Di fferenti  a1 
Percent  Female  56.2  48.1 
Coefficient  and  standard errors from separate  union and  nonunion OLS  regressions  of log wage  on  proportion  female 
in  occupation,  proportion  female  in  establishment,  proportion  female  in  work  group,  and  an  individual  female  dummy. 
Extent of  segregation =  (sample variance  of proportion  female  among  constituents of labor market  structure) / 
(maximum possible variance). 
Coefficient  (from column  1)  mu1 tip1  ied by  extent of segregation  (from column  2). 
An  individual's work  group  is  defined as  all workers  in the same  occupation at the same  establishment. 
Differences  between  the observed  differential and  the total of the contributions of the structures are due  to use 
of i  ndustry-wide proportion female  in  occupation rather than  sector-speci f i  c estimates. 
Source:  BLS  Plastics Industry Wage  Survey. Table 6 
Union Effects on  the Structure of the  Female/Male 
Wage  Differential  in  the Nonelectrical  Machinery 
Industry 
Nonunion  Establ ishments  Union  Establishments 
1  2  3  1  2  3 
Coef f i  ci  ent on  Coefficient on 
Proporti  on  Extent  Proporti  on  Extent 
Labor  Market  Femal e  '  o  f  Structure  Femal el  of  Structure 
Structure  . .  Se~reaati  on
2  Contri  bution





Establ i  shment  -.  152  .444 
(.010) 
Work  Group
4  -.015  .634 
(.011) 
Total  -.  223  -.  302 
Observed  Di fferenti  a1  -.  249  -.  277 
Percent  Female  25.2  9.4 
'  Coefficient and  standard  errors  from separate  union and  nonunion OLS  regressions  of log wage  on  proportion  female  in 
occupation,  proportion  female  in  establishment,  proportion  female  in  work  group,  and  an  individual  female  dummy. 
Extent  of segregation =  (sample  variance of proportion  female  among  constituents of labor market  structure) /  (maximum 
possi  bl  e variance) . 
Coefficient  (from column  1  )  mu1 tip1  ied by  extent of segregation  (from column  2). 
An  individual's work  group  is  defined as  all workers  in the same  occupation at the same  establishment. 
Differences  between  the observed  differential and  the total of the contributions of the  structures are due  to use  of 
industry-wide proportion female  in  occupation rather than  sector-speci f i  c estimates. 
Source:  BLS  None1  ectri  cal  Machinery  Industry Wage  Survey. Table  7 
Summary  of  U.S.  Equal  Opportunity Policy Provisions 
Pol i  cy 
(Year) 
Equal  Pay  Act 
(1  963) 
Title VII, 




11246  (1965) 
and 
11376  (1967) 
Title IX, 
Civil Rights 
Act  (1975) 
proposed 
Provisions  (Description) ' 
Equal  Pay  (prohibits  pay  inequality on 
the basis of sex  among  workers  performing 
equal  jobs in the same  establishment) 
Equal  Pay  and 
Equal  Employment  Opportunity  (EEO)  (prohi- 
bits sex  discrimination Cbv  em~lovers  with 
more  than 15  employees1  inuvirtuaily a1 1 
aspects of  employment:  hiring,  firing, 
training,  promotions,  and other terms  and 
conditions of  employment) 
Equal  Pay, 
Equal  Employment  Opportunity  (EEO)  and 
Affirmative Action (requires  setting goals 
and  timetables to  reduce  under-representa- 
tion of  women  in an  firm's employment  pat- 
terns as  a condition of  receipt of federal 
contracts or subcontracts) 
Equal  Education  (prohibits sex  di  scrimi  na- 
tion in  course  offerings,  athletic acti- 
vities and facilities,  financial assistance, 
counseling,  textbooks,  etc.,  in  educational 
institutions receiving federal  funds) 
Comparable  Worth  (requires  equal  pay  for 
jobs of  comparable  value  to  the employer  or  .  - 
worth, i  .e.;  of comparable  ski  11 , respon- 
sibility, working conditions,  knowledge,  etc 





Emp 1  oymen t 










'Some  provisions of these  acts are repetitive.  For  brevity,  descriptions 
are included only once  in  this table. Table 8 
Relationship Between  Equal  Opportunity Policy Provisions 
and  Components  of the  FemaleIMale  Wage  Differential 
Pol i  cy Provi  sion  '  to  Reduce  Component, 
Assuming  Source  is: 
Component  Factor 
(Estimated Mean  (Estimated  Employer 
%  Diffl.') -  Mean)  Discrimination  Human  Capital 
Individual  G  (-.01>  Equal  Pay, 
(-1%)  EEO  Training 
Equal  Education 
Occupation  B
O  (mfg:  -.35  Comparable  Worth  n.a. 
Segregation  svc:  -.73) 
(mfg:  -11% 
svc:  -26%)  So  ( .40)  EEO  Hiring and  Promotion,  Equal  Education 
EEO  Training, 
Affirmative Action 
Establishment  B
e  (-.28)  none  n.a. 
Segregation 
(-6%)  S
e  (.21)  EEO  Hiring, 
4  n.a. 
Affirmative Action 
Work  Group  B
w  (-.12)  Comparable  Worth  n.a. 
Segregation 
(-7%)  S
w  (.61>  EEO  Hiring and  Promotion,  n.a. 
4 
EEO  Training, 
Affirmative Action 
TOTAL  WAGE  DIFFERENTIAL  (mfg:  -23%,  svc: -36%) 
n.a.:  Not  applicable;  no policy remedy  will affect this factor. 
'See  Table  7 for summary  of these pol  icy provisions and  the legislation and 
regulations that contain them.  EEO  an  acronym for Equal  Employment 
Opportunity.  This  table lists only short-run effects of these policies; 
long-run effects are very likely to  be  sizable,  but are difficult  to 
classify.  For  instance,  EEO  promotions  presumably enhance  the skills of  the 
women  promoted,  increasing their human  capital. 
2  Expressed as  percentage  deviations from the geometric mean  wage. 
3These factors are defined in  the  text and  in  Table  1.  Estimates  are  simple 
means  for the values reported in  Tables  3  and  4.  G,  B
O,  B
e  and  B
w  are 
estimated OLS  coefficients for the wage  effects of increasing proportion 
female.  So,  S
e  and  S
w  are measures  of  the amount  of  segregation by 
constituents of the components. 
41f establishments or work  groups  are  sorted by  qua1 i  ty of worker,  then 
Equal  Education could reduce  this component.  Otherwise,  no policy remedies 
would affect this factor. - 34 - 
Appendi  x 
Job Classifications Surveyed in Industry Wage ~urvevs' 
MISCELLANEOUS PLASTICS PRODUCTS  (1974) 
Processing Jobs 
Blenders 
Blow-molding-machine operators  (set  up and operate) 
Blow-molding-machine operators  (operate  only) 
Compression-molding-machine operators  (set  up and operate) 
Compression-molding-machine operators  (operate  only) 
Extrusion-press operators  (set  up and operate) 
Extrusion-press operators  (operate  only) 
Finishers, molded plastics products 
Injection-molding-machine operators  (set  up and operate) 
Injection-molding-machine operators  (operate  only) 
Laminating-press operators 
Mandrel  men 
Plastics cutters, machine 
Preform-machine operators 
Scrap-preparing operators 
Setup Men, Plastic-Molding Machines 
161  Blow-mol  di  ng machines 
162  Compression-molding machines 
163  Extrusion presses 
164  Injection-molding machines 
165  Vacuum-plastics-forming machines 
166  Other  (including  combination of above) 
170  Tumbler operators 
180  Vacuum-plastics-forming-machine operators  (set  up and operate) 
190  Vacuum-plastics-forming-machine operators  (operate  only) 
Maintenance Jobs 
200  Electricians, maintenance 
210  He1  pers, trades, maintenance 
220  Machine-tool operators, toolroom 
230  Machinists, maintenance 
240  Maintenance men, general uti  1  i ty 
250  Mechanics, maintenance 
260  Pipefitters, maintenance 
270  Tool  and die makers 
'SOURCE:  U.S. Department of  Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Division of 
Occupational  Wage Structures. PLASTICS,  continued 
Miscellaneous  Jobs 
310  Inspectors,  molded  products 
320  Jan i  tors 
330  Laborers,  material handling 
340  Packers,  shipping 
350  Recei vi  ng  cl  erks 
360  Shipping clerks 
370  Shipping and  receiving clerks 
Truckers,  Power 
381  Forklift 
382  Other  than forklift 
390  Hatchmen 
2.  NONELECTRICAL  MACHINERY  (1983) 
Machine-Tool  Operator,  Production 
Automatic-Lathe Operator 
5111  ClassA 
5112  Class  B 
5113  Class C 
5114  NIC,  set up  and  operate 
5115  NIC,  operate only 
Drill-Press Operator,  Radial 
5121  Class A 
5122  Class B 
5123  Class C 
5124  NIC,  set up  and operate 
5125  NIC,  operate only 
Dri  11-Press  Operator,  Single-  or Mu1 tiple-Spindle 
5131  Class  A 
5132  Class B 
5133  Class C 
5134  NIC,  set up  and  operate 
5135  NIC,  operate only 
Engine-Lathe Operator 
5141  Class  A 
5142  Class  B 
5143  Class  C 
5144  NIC,  set up  and  operate 
5145  NIC,  operate only 
Grinding-Machine Operator 
5151  Class A 
5152  Class B 
5153  Class C 
5154  NIC,  set up  and  operate 
5155  NIC,  operate only MACHINERY,  continued 
Machi  ne-Tool  Operator,  Mi  scel  1  aneous 
5161  Class  A 
5162  Class  B 
5163  Class  C 
5164  NIC,  set up  and  operate 
5165  NIC,  operate only 
Milling-Machine Operator 
5171  Class  A 
5172  Class B 
5173  Class  C 
5174  NIC,  set up  and  operate 
5175  NIC,  operate only 
Screw-Machine  Operator,  Automatic 
5181  Class  A 
5182  Class  B 
5183  Class  C 
5184  NIC,  set up  and  operate 
5185  NIC,  operate only 
Turret-Lathe Operator,  Hand 
5191  Class  A 
5192  Class  B 
5193  Class  C 
5194  NIC,  set up  and  operate 
5195  NIC,  operate only 
Other  Jobs 
Set-Up  Worker,  Machine  Tools 
5201  Conventional  machi nes 
5202  NIC machines 
Punch-Press  Operator 
5211  Class  A 
5212  Class  B 
Assembler 
5221  ClassA 
5222  Class B 
5223  Class C 
5230  Polisher and  buffer,  metal 
5240  Polishing-  and  buffing-machine  operator 
Welder,  Hand 
5251  Class  A 
5252  Class  B 
Welder,  Machine 
5261  Class A 
5262  Class  B MACHINERY,  conti  nued 
Tool  and  Die Maker 
5271  Tool  and  die maker  (jobbing) 
5272  Tool  and  die maker  (other  than  jobbing) 
Inspector 
5281  Class  A 
5282  Class B 
5283  Class  C 
5290  Tool  clerk 
3070  Machinist,  maintenance 
5330  Machinist,  production 
3100  Mechanic,  maintenance 
3010  Carpenter,  maintenance 
3020  Electrician,  maintenance 
4030  Janitor,  porter,  or cleaner  ' 
4070  Laborer,  material handling 
Machine-Tool  Operator,  Toolroom (Operates  Only One  Type  of Machine Tool) 
3061  Drill-press operator,  radial 
3062  Engine-lathe operator 
3063  Grinding-machine operator 
3064  Milling-machine operator 
3065  Other  (not  specified)  toolroom machine 
3068  Operates more  than one  type of  machine  tool 
3.  LIFE INSURANCE  CARRIERS  (1979) 
Selected Insurance Occupations 
Actuaries 
101  Class  A 
102  ClassB 
Cl aim Approvers 
201  Class  A 
202  Class  B 
300  Clerks,  policy evaluation 
310  Clerks,  premium-ledger-card 
Correspondents 
321  ClassA 
322  Class  B 
330  Premi um  acceptors 
Underwriters 
401  Class  A 
402  ClassB INSURANCE, conti  nued 
Selected General  Clerical Occupations 
Clerks, Accounting 
501  Class A 
502  Class B 
503  Not classifiable by  level 
Clerks, File 
511  ClassA 
512  Class B 
513  Class C 
514  Not classifiable by  level 
Key  Entry Operators 
521  ClassA 
522  Class B 
523  Not classifiable by  level  . 
Secretaries 
531  ClassA 
532  Class B 
533  Class C 
534  Class D 
535  Class E 
536  Not classifiable by  level 
Stenographers 
541  General 
542  Senior 
543  Not classifiable by  level 
Switchboard Operators 
551  Class A 
552  Class B 
560  Transcribing-machine typists 
Typists 
571  Class A 
572  Class B 
573  Not classifiable by  level 
Selected Computer Occupations 
Computer Operators 
601  Class A 
602  ClassB 
603  Class C 
604  Not classifiable by  level INSURANCE,  continued 
Computer  Programmers,  Business 
611  ClassA 
612  Class  B 
613  Class C 
614  Not  classifiable by level 
Computer  Systems  Analysts,  Business 
621  ClassA 
622  Class  B 
623  Class C 
624  Not  classifiable by level 
630  Data  1  ibrarians 
4.  BANKING  (1979) 
Selected General  Cler-ical  Occupations 
Bookkeeping-Machine Operators 
1010  Class  A 
1020  Class  B 
Clerks,  File 
1030  Class  A 
1040  Class  B 
1050  Class C 
1053  Not  classifiable by level 
Clerks,  Accounting 
1055-  Class A 
1056  Class B 
1057  Not  classifiable by level 
Key  Entry Operators 
1060  Class A 
1070  Class B 
1075  Not  classifiable by  level 
Secretaries 
1101  Class  A 
1102  Class  B 
1103  Class C 
1104  Class D 
1105  Class  E 
1106  Not  classifiable by level 
Stenographers 
1110  General 
1120  Senior 
1125  Not  classifiable by level BANKING, continued 
Switchboard Operators 
1130  Class A 
1140  Class B 
Typists 
1150  Class A 
1160  Class B 
1165  Not classifiable by level 
Selected Computer Occupations 
Computer Operators 
2010  Class A 
2020  Class B 
2030  Class C 
2035  Not classifiable by  level 
Computer Programmers, Business 
2040  Class A 
2050  Class B 
2060  Class C 
2065  Not classifiable by level 
Computer Systems Analysts, Business 
2070  Class A 
2080  Class B 
2090  Class C 
2095  Not classifiable by  level 
Selected Banki  ng Occupations 
1080  Proof-machine operators 
1090  Safe-deposit-rental  clerks 
Tel  lers 
3010  Note 
3020  Commercial-savings  (paying  and receiving) 
3030  Commercial 
3040  Savings 
3050  All-round 
Loan Officers 
4010  Personal credi  t 
4011  Commercial loans 
4012  Mortgage 
4013  Not classifiable by type of loan 5.  COMPUTER  AND  DATA  PROCESSING  SERVICES  (1982) 
Computer  Operators 
101  Level I 
102  Level  I1 
103  LevelIII 
104  Level  IV 
105  Level  V 
106  Level  VI 
110  Data Librarians 
Electronics  Technicians 
121  LevelI 
122  LevelII 
123  Level  I11 
Key  Entry Operators 
131  Level I 
132  Level  I1 
140  Peripheral Equipment  Operators 
ProgrammerIProgrammer Analysts 
151  Level I 
152  LevelII 
153  LevelIII 
154  Level  IV 
155  Level  V 
Systems  Analysts 
161  Level I 
162  Level  I1 
163  Level  I11 
Systems  Programmers 
171  LevelI 
172  LevelII 
173  Level  I11 
174  Level  IV 